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Off-Market Buybacks in Australia:  




Off-market share buybacks in Australia are often structured with the buyback price 
comprising a large dividend component (which may carry imputation tax credits) and a small 
capital component. This unique structure has the consequence that institutions on low tax 
rates stand to benefit most from selling shares into the buyback. In this paper, we explore 
evidence of abnormal trading activities around key dates in the conduct of off-market 
buybacks and investigate the drivers of these activities. We find evidence of abnormal trading 
activities around the initial announcement and the final announcement dates of the buyback. 
The significant differences in abnormal volumes between the buybacks with and without 
imputation tax credits highlight the importance of tax motivations in explaining abnormal 
trading activities in the shares of companies conducting off-market buybacks, and are 
consistent with observed buying pressure around the announcement of the buyback. 
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The market reaction to the announcement of a share repurchase has been the focus of 
many studies since the seminal work of Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) in the U.S. Other 
countries have been slower to enact legislation to allow share repurchases, but all studies 
conducted to date show that the market reaction to a share repurchase announcement tends to 
be positive. In Australia the liberalization of buyback regulations occurred in December 1995, 
and since then share buybacks have become an important capital management tool used by 
companies to return cash to investors.1 Companies may buy back shares either on-market or 
off-market. On-market buybacks (equivalent to open market repurchases in the U.S.) are 
carried out on the Australian Securities Exchange in the ordinary course of trading. The focus 
of this study is on equal access share buybacks (equivalent to tender offers in the US context), 
a type of off-market buyback where all shareholders are invited by the company to tender 
some or all of their shares into the buyback.2  
Prior event studies typically investigate the market reaction to the announcement of a 
buyback by studying returns in a narrow window around the announcement date. Other 
important dates in the buyback process are generally ignored in these studies (see, Brown 
2007). Our study is different. We focus on two key dates, the initial announcement date and 
the final announcement date, and investigate abnormal trading activities and abnormal returns 
around these dates. There are considerable uncertainties surrounding the final details of the 
buyback which are not resolved until the buyback closes. For example, the final buyback 
price (in a Dutch auction tender) and the extent of the under- or over-subscription are not 
known until the company announces the outcomes on the final announcement date. By 
investigating abnormal returns and volumes around the final announcement date we can 
document whether there are abnormal trading activities around the closing date and 
investigate possible causes of abnormal returns and volumes.  
Off-market buybacks in Australia offer tax advantages to low marginal tax-rate investors 
(which are mainly institutions). These tax advantages can be captured by buying shares on 
announcement of the buyback and selling these same shares back to the company through the 
buyback offer. This observation suggests the existence of tax-induced abnormal trading 
activities around the initial announcement date. Often the repurchases are over-subscribed 
                                                          
1 Australian companies were first allowed to undertake share repurchases in 1989. The First Corporate Law 
Simplification Bill was enacted in December 1995, leading to simplification of the processes and regulations that 
govern buybacks.  
2 Within off-market buybacks, there are four categories of buyback - minimum holding, selective, employee and 
equal access. 
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and institutions that have bought up shares on the initial announcement are unable to sell all 
the acquired shares into the buyback. They subsequently sell these ‘excess’ shares when the 
final outcome is announced on the completion date. The initial purchasing creates buying 
pressure and the selling of ‘excess’ shares on the completion date creates selling pressure. 
These activities are associated with observed abnormal returns and abnormal volumes around 
both these key dates. As compared to on-market buybacks, the observed abnormal trading 
activity and any changes in market structure (such as changes in bid-ask spread) can be 
attributed to investor trading activity rather than firms’ own trading activities.  
To further substantiate our hypothesis of tax-induced trading we use the net buying 
pressure variable to directly test our conjecture that investors are buying shares on 
announcement in order to participate in the buyback, and selling unsuccessfully tendered 
shares after the final announcement. We also investigate liquidity around the key dates using 
the Amihud illiquidity measure and the effective half spread measure which offer convincing 
evidence of increases in market liquidity around the initial announcement date and some 
evidence for increased liquidity around the final announcement date. Our setting provides a 
unique opportunity to investigate the effects on trading activity and market structure of tax-
induced trading of large institutional shareholders.  
This paper makes four main contributions to the literature on share repurchases. First, it 
documents tax-induced abnormal trading activity around two key dates in the off-market 
buyback process in Australia. Second, our approach allows for the separation of the 
information effect and the tax effect on abnormal returns and volumes. The results provide 
direct evidence that abnormal trading is higher for buybacks with larger tax benefits, thus 
supporting a tax-induced trading effect.  This adds to our understanding of the importance of 
tax effects in company capital raisings. Third, by studying two key dates, we capture the 
information effects for the whole buyback period, and provide direct evidence of investor 
portfolio rebalancing around buybacks when information is released on the final 
announcement date.  Fourth, we link the abnormal trading activities to observed changes in 
liquidity variables around the key dates, showing that increases in market liquidity are 
associated with tax-induced trading activities. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature 
review of off-market buybacks. Section 3 provides a description of hypotheses, data and 
method. The results and discussions of the analyses are presented in Section 4. We 
summarize the paper in Section 5. 
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2. Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of the taxation treatment of off-market buybacks in Australia  
Interaction between Australian taxation law3 and company law has led to the unique 
taxation treatment of off-market buybacks. When a company buys back its own shares, the 
consideration paid to a participant (the buyback price) is divided into a dividend component 
and a capital component. The company determines the capital component after consultation 
with the Commissioner of Taxation.4 The remainder is the deemed dividend component.5 
Alternatively, the entire buyback price can be set as capital component.  
Australia operates under a full dividend imputation system, which removes the double 
taxation of dividends. Under the imputation system resident companies generate imputation 
or ‘franking credits’ for the company tax paid. Franking credits accumulate in the company’s 
franking account, which keeps track of the income tax credits that are able to be distributed to 
shareholders. Companies with sufficient undistributed imputation tax credits can distribute 
these tax credits to participating shareholders through the deemed dividend component of the 
buyback. 6 Imputation tax credits can be used to offset personal income tax for resident 
shareholders.7 For superannuation funds (funds that manage compulsory retirement saving in 
Australia) whose marginal tax rate is 15 percent and therefore less than the company tax rate 
of 30 percent, imputation tax credits involve tax rebates. In addition, the capital component of 
the buyback price can be very low, even to the point of generating capital losses. Capital 
losses can then be used to offset realized capital gains on other assets. Low marginal tax rate 
                                                          
3 Taxation treatment provisions are provided in the Income Tax Assessment Act (1936) (ITAA 1936). 
4 The Commissioner of Taxation reviews the request from the company for the dividend and capital split in the 
light of balance sheet constraints, retained earnings and the balance of a company’s franking account. The Tax 
Commissioner then makes a class ruling on the income tax consequences of the buyback that are effective for 
the financial year in which the buyback takes place.  
5 This is a simplification of the actual treatment which changed in 2004. Prior to 2004, for tax purposes the 
capital component (sale price) of shares sold in an off-market buyback was calculated as the difference between 
the dividend amount and the buyback price  From 2004, this was changed such that the capital component for 
tax purposes was calculated as the difference between the pre-announcement market price of the share and the 
dividend amount.  
6 The terms “imputation tax credits” and “tax credits” are used interchangeably. Tax credits represent Australian 
corporate tax paid by the company on the profits from which the dividend has been distributed. The tax credits 
received by a resident taxpayer with a marginal tax rate of t from the Australian Tax Office (ATO) is calculated 
as D (t – tc)/ (1 - tc), where D represents the size of the deemed dividend component and tc is the company tax 
rate. When all the imputation tax credits are distributed, and all recipients are able to fully utilise them then the 
imputation system effectively eliminates the double taxation of dividends (Officer 1994). Undistributed franking 
credits (tax credits) lose value over time so distribution of the tax credits to the maximum extent possible is 
optimal from shareholders’ perspective. Off-market buybacks provide a mechanism (other than through ordinary 
dividends) for Australian companies to distribute franking credits to their shareholders. 
7 Australian resident individuals, complying superannuation funds, registered organisations and life assurance 
companies can use distributed imputation tax credits to offset their tax liabilities. For superannuation funds in 
Australia, this rebate is equal to approximately 21 percent.  
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investors such as superannuation funds benefit from participating in the buyback, especially 
when using capital losses to offset other short term capital gains (Brown and Davis 2012).8 
Because the tax treatment rests on last-in-first-out (LIFO) principles, any shares purchased on 
announcement of the buyback are deemed to be the first shares sold into the buyback. 
Investors can claim the imputation tax credits only if the shares are held for 45 days not 
including purchase and sale dates (that is there must 46 days between announcement and 
closing dates). 
However, participating shareholders do not receive these advantages without some 
tradeoffs. The Australian Tax Office has allowed the buyback price to be set at a maximum 
discount of 14%.9 In contrast, self-tender offers in the U.S are generally conducted at a 
premium to compensate shareholders who incur a capital gains tax liability immediately upon 
tendering their shares (Anderson and Dyl 2004).   
Using arguments similar to the tax-arbitrage arguments in the dividend literature (see 
Miller and Modigliani 1961; Strickland 1997; Grinstein and Michaely 2005), we postulate 
that particular tax clienteles which stand to benefit most from selling shares into the buyback, 
become the marginal and price-setting investors. Further evidence that the tax position of 
important shareholders, such as pension funds and other institutional shareholders, is a key 
factor in corporate payout policy is provided by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and Short, Zhang 
and Keasey (2002) (using UK data from a partial imputation tax system) and Lie and Lie 
(1999) (using US data from a classical tax system). 
These institutional investors cause price pressure as they attempt to capture the 
imputation tax credits by buying shares in the announcement period in order to sell those 
shares into the buyback.  Superannuation funds (on a 15 percent marginal tax rate) and 
charities (on a zero tax rate) belong to this clientele (Brown and Efthim 2005, Brown 2007, 
Brown and Davis 2012). The observed positive announcement abnormal returns are related to 
such a price pressure effect, which is argued to be mainly driven by these institutional 
investors.  
                                                          
8 For assets held for more than twelve months individuals pay capital gains tax at their marginal rate on one half 
of the capital gain. For superannuation two thirds of the gain is taxable. Short term capital gains are generated 
when an investor sells an asset that has not been held for more than 12 months. Hence, this portion of capital 
gains is taxed at the full marginal tax rate of the investor and not subject to the discount method of capital gains 
tax.  
9 In late 2007 the Australian Tax Office released a Practice Statement (PSLA 2007/9) stating that the maximum 
discount was to be 14 per cent of the average market price over five days prior to the buyback. This practice had 
been in effect for a number of years prior to that release. The level of discount is a relevant consideration in the 
exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion in ruling on the dividend/capital structure of the buyback. 
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Uncertainty surrounding the final outcome of the buyback is resolved around the final 
announcement date, when the company announces the final buyback price and the extent of 
any scaleback (too many shares tendered) or shortfall (not enough shares tendered). 
Institutions which bought on the announcement date in order to sell shares into the buyback 
(and generate the tax advantages) must typically rebalance portfolios once the results of the 
buyback are known. This causes abnormal trading activity around the final announcement 
date.  
Although the tax treatment is somewhat complex, a simplified illustration of why and 
how the current tax treatment of off-market self-tender offers benefits to low tax paying 
entities is contained in the Appendix. The example used is the $6 billion10 BHP Billiton off-
market share repurchase that occurred in 2011. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Prior studies on buybacks typically find a positive reaction at the announcement of a 
buyback.11 While several reasons have been established in the literature to explain the market 
reaction, two predominant hypotheses emerge to establish the main drivers.12 They are the 
undervaluation-signaling hypothesis (Dann 1981; Vermaelen 1981; Ofer and Thakor 1987; 
Stephen and Weisbach 1998; Peyer and Vermaelen 2009) and the free-cash-flow agency cost 
hypothesis (Jensen 1986; Bagwell and Shoven 1989; Nohel and Tarhan 1998; Grullon and 
Michaely 2004). The tax induced trading and price pressure hypothesis which has been 
established in the dividend literature (Ainsworth et al. 2010) also provides a framework for 
our investigation of price and volume effects around the key dates in the buyback.   
 
2.2.1 Signaling and Agency Costs   
A share repurchase plays a role in mitigating the asymmetric information that exists 
between managers and shareholders. When managers buy back shares at a premium to the 
market price, they are conveying to shareholders that their stock prices are currently 
                                                          
10 All figures are quoted in Australian dollars. 
11  A vast literature provides evidence of abnormal announcement returns. See for example, Dann (1981), 
Vermaelen (1981), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), Comment and Jarrell (1991), D’Mello and Schroff 
(2000), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990), Anderson and Dyl (2004). Zhang (2005) finds that the market 
responds positively to repurchases in Hong Kong. Wang et al. (2009) examine share repurchase announcements 
in the U.K. and find consistent evidence. 
12 Other relevant hypotheses explaining buyback announcement abnormal returns include the leverage effect 
(Bagwell and Shoven 1989; Opler and Titman 1996; Dittmar 2000; Hovakimian et al. 2001; Hovakimian 2004; 
Mitchell and Dharmawan 2007), takeover defence (Bagwell 1991; Billett and Xue 2007), and to counter dilution 
due to employee and management stock options (Fenn and Liang 1997; Chan et al. 2010). 
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undervalued. Management survey results are also consistent with the empirical evidence of 
the undervaluation-signaling hypothesis being the main driver of announcement abnormal 
returns (Brav et al. 2005 (U.S.); Mitchell et al. 2001 (Australia)). However, there are also 
studies that show that stock repurchases may not increase shareholder value due to distortions 
arising from using the earnings per share (EPS) measure in making repurchase decisions 
(refer to Oded and Michel (2008) for a numerical example). Moreover the market may react 
differentially to company share repurchase announcements. For example, for firms with a 
greater level of non-managerial options, Kahle (2002) finds that the market reacts less 
positively to repurchases because firms typically use repurchases to fund employee stock 
options exercise.  
The free-cash-flow agency cost hypothesis asserts that payout of excess cash flows to 
shareholders through share repurchases can lower agency costs (Jensen 1986). If excess cash 
is not distributed back to shareholders, managers are inclined to invest in perquisites, empire 
building and other negative net present value investments. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) document stronger positive market reactions when firms with 
higher levels of cash reserves announce an intention to repurchase shares. The model in Oded 
(2011) conjectures that tender offers reduce free cash flows more efficiently than open-
market repurchases, because excess cash can be distributed more quickly via tender offers.  
A comprehensive study investigating Australian on-market repurchases 13 by Mitchell 
and Dharmawan (2007) find that firms have a stronger incentive to signal undervaluation and 
reduction in agency costs using on-market repurchases. In comparison with the U.S., 
Australia implements a more transparent and timely disclosure of important information 
surrounding on-market repurchase programs, which should encourage the use of repurchases 
as a signaling tool. Consistent with Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007), Akyol and Foo (2012) 
find evidence of more positive announcement reactions for those Australian on-market 
repurchases in which managers report a motive for the undervaluation to the market.  
However, it is important to note that unlike US self-tender offers, Australian off-market 
buybacks, particularly those with tax credits attached, are often offered at a discount to the 
market price. 14  Indeed, for recent Dutch auctions the company often states that it will 
undertake the repurchase only if it can be completed at a minimum discount to market 
                                                          
13 In Australia, open-market repurchases are referred to as on-market repurchases. 
14 Imputation credits are also called “franking” credits. 
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price.15 This distinctive feature eliminates the potential for the signaling hypothesis to explain 
the market reaction to announcement of Australian off-market buybacks, as an announcement 
that the company is buying back shares at a price below the market price is not a credible 
signal of undervaluation.   
 
2.2.2 Tax-induced trading and price pressure  
We draw a parallel between tax–induced trading around ex-dividend dates and what we 
hypothesize to be tax-induced trading around buyback dates. The theoretical and empirical 
literature investigating share price behavior has established that tax clienteles explain the 
trading and price behavior around ex-dividend dates.16 Investors who value dividends more 
than capital gains will hold and buy stocks cum-dividend and investors who value capital 
gains more will sell stocks cum-dividend. Both sides trade with each other during the cum-
dividend period and subsequently reverse their trades on the first ex-day. Moreover, trading 
volume on the ex-day increases with the tax heterogeneity of shareholders and with the 
dividend yield but is negatively associated with the level of transaction costs (Michaely and 
Murgia 1995; Michaely and Vila 1995, 1996; Dhaliwal and Li 2006). This trading strategy is 
also consistent with dividend clientele models (Miller and Modigliani 1961; Strickland 1997; 
Grinstein and Michaely 2005). 17 The dividend clientele effects also apply to institutional 
investors where some institutions consistently hold high dividend yield stocks while some 
consistently hold low dividend yield stocks, and where the institutional clientele changes 
according to a firm’s dividend policy (Hotchkiss and Lawrence 2007).  
While most of the early ex-dividend literature is based on US studies, there is also 
empirical evidence of tax-induced trading around the ex-dividend day in non-US settings.  
For instance, Liljeblom, Loflund and Hedvall (2001) find that tax heterogeneity between 
foreign and domestic investors in Finland drives abnormal trading volumes around the ex-
dividend day. A more comprehensive study by Rantapuska (2008) employing the identity of 
Finnish traders as well as the volume and direction of their trades around the ex-dividend day, 
                                                          
15 For example in the 2004 BHP off-market repurchase the company stated that the repurchase would proceed 
only at a discount of at least 5% to the volume weighted average price in the last five days up to and including 
the closing date of the buyback. 
16 See, inter alia Elton and Gruber 1970; Kalay 1984; Miller and Scholes 1982; Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
1986; Karpoff and Walkling 1988; Michaely and Vila 1995; Michaely and Vila 1996; Koski and Scruggs 1998; 
Allen and Michaely 2003; Callaghan and Barry 2003; Dhaliwal and Li 2006; Graham and Kumar 2006; 
Felixson and Liljeblom 2008. 
17 Dividend clienteles exist if firms that pay lower (higher) dividends attract investors with higher (lower) 
marginal tax rates (Miller and Modigliani 1961). However, dividend clientele effects are not the sole reason 
determining the choice of investments (Allen and Michaely 2003). Long term stability of cash flows and cash 
position of firms are found to be more important than tax reasons (Farre-Mensa et al. 2014).   
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also documents trading evidence consistent with investors’ tax-induced preferences for 
dividends or capital gains. Milonas et al. (2006) find evidence consistent with tax-induced 
trading around the ex-dividend day of Chinese stocks. 
For Australian evidence, Ainsworth et al. (2010) employ 33 Australian institutional fund 
managers’ daily transactions around the ex-dividend day and find that institutional investors 
sell their shares during the cum-dividend period and buy back after the ex-dividend day. They 
argue that such tax-induced trading is driven by institutions taking advantage of the long-term 
capital gains tax discount18 by maximizing their selling price prior to the ex-dividend day. 
Consistent with the evidence on ex-dividend trading behavior we argue that tax-induced 
trading, with the intention of obtaining imputation tax credits, generates price pressure 
surrounding the key dates of Australian off-market buyback announcements. 
Employing a sample from 1996 to 2003, Brown (2007) finds that for equal-access off-
market repurchases, statistically significant abnormal returns of around 1.2% exist on the 
announcement day and the subsequent day of the repurchase. However, somewhat different 
from tax-induced trading around ex-dividend days where tax heterogeneity drives the trading, 
trading volumes around Australian off-market buybacks are most likely driven by the same 
group of investors, that is superannuation funds in the marginal tax bracket of 15%. Brown 
and Davis (2012) show that Australian Taxation Office restrictions on the tender price range 
may result in the transfer of tax benefits to investors who participate in the buybacks. These 
investors are typically institutions with low marginal tax rates. Similarly, Alpert et al. (2011) 
demonstrate that the tax treatment of off-market buybacks distorts wealth transfer from non-
participants to participants in buybacks. However, firms’ corporate governance systems can 
moderate the level of wealth transfer.  
The observed abnormal returns on announcement of a share repurchase may not be 
entirely an information effect especially in cases where abnormal trading volumes are 
present. Under the price pressure hypothesis of Scholes (1972), shifts in uninformed excess 
demand may move prices temporarily away from their information-efficient values. A price 
pressure effect has been detected in many corporate events.19 For example, Harris and Gurel 
(1986) document abnormal returns for firms added to the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 
index on the inclusion day and a reversal after two weeks, arguing  that the observed 
                                                          
18 Ainsworth et al. (2010) argue that institutional investors value capital gains more than dividends because of 
the introduction of a capital gains tax (CGT) discount for shares held longer than 12 months from September 
1999, combined with the option for funds to employ a first-in first-out inventory method to calculate CGT 
holding periods. 
19 See, Maloney and Mulherin (1992) and Frank and Jagannathan (1998).  
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abnormal returns are the result of price pressure effects, rather than signaling a change in 
future return distributions. Gygax and Otchere (2010) find evidence of price pressure effects 
dominating information effects when S&P revises the composition of the S&P 500 index. In 
another example of the price pressure effect, Mitchell et al. (2004) find that cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAARs) drift downwards during the merger pricing period for 
certain types of acquirers. This arises due to merger arbitrageurs short selling, and CAARs 
immediately reverse direction at the end of the pricing period. To the best of our knowledge, 
there have been no previous studies on tax-induced price pressure in the context of buybacks.  
 
2.2.3 Liquidity and Share Buybacks 
 Prior studies examining the liquidity impact of companies buying back shares have 
been limited to on-market buybacks. Barclay and Smith (1988) analyze open-market-
repurchase programs conducted by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange from 1970 
to 1978. They find that the bid-ask spreads of these stocks widen around repurchase 
announcement dates. This finding is interpreted as managers using inside information to 
benefit themselves at the shareholders’ expense. As a follow-up study, Miller and McConnell 
(1995) examine open-market repurchase programs on the New York Stock Exchange 
between 1984 and 1988. However, they do not find evidence of spreads increasing around 
announcement date.  
 More recently, Oded (2009) investigates the liquidity effect of US firms’ open-market 
repurchase announcements between 2003 and 2004. Consistent with Barclay and Smith 
(1988), he finds a wider bid-ask spread around the announcement date. Oded (2009) proposes 
that the wider bid-ask spread could be due to the greater ask price since the market expects 
the firms to have inside information, leading to an adverse selection problem. This problem 
leads to a lower rate of share repurchase program completion. Investigating the relatively new 
accelerated share repurchase announcements, where an investment bank guarantees the 
repurchase based on an agreed price, Kulchania (2013) finds improvements in stock liquidity 
(rise in market depth, bid size, offer size) upon accelerated share repurchase announcement. 
In contrast to on-market buybacks, the impact on liquidity created by off-market 
buybacks announcements can be attributed to investors rather than the firms themselves. We 






3. Hypotheses, Data and Research Method 
3.1  Hypotheses 
The periods from the buyback announcement date to the ex-entitlement date and the 
buyback final announcement date are important dates for tax-related trading activities. The 
timeline in Figure 1 illustrates the key dates for Australian off-market buybacks, namely the 
announcement of the buyback, the ex-entitlement date (the day after the cum-entitlement 
date)20 and the buyback final announcement date where the size of scaleback (or shortfall) 
and buyback price in the case of a Dutch auction are announced.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Based on our previous arguments relating to tax-induced trading at the announcement of 
a buyback, we expect tax arbitrageurs to buy shares in order to participate in the buyback, 
leading to significant abnormal volumes and possibly abnormal returns. Given prior studies 
on the announcement effects of off-market buybacks we expect positive abnormal returns on 
announcement of the buyback. 
Hypothesis 1a: The initial announcement date is associated with positive abnormal 
returns and abnormal volumes. 
If the trading activity is tax-induced, we expect the abnormal volumes to be greater for 
buybacks distributing franking credits (FC) relative to those that do not distribute franking 
credits (non-FC), as buying pressure is created by investors who gain tax benefits from the 
buybacks. In the presence of abnormal volumes price effects may not be driven purely by 
information, so it is not clear whether abnormal returns will be greater for the FC sample 
relative to the non-FC sample. We state the following two hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1b: At the initial announcement date abnormal volumes are greater for 
those buybacks that distribute franking credits relative to those that do not. 
Hypothesis 1c:  At the initial announcement date abnormal returns are greater for those 
buybacks that distribute franking credits relative to those that do not. 
 
                                                          
20 The ex-entitlement date may appear to be a key date in the buyback timeline. However, in order for the 
investor to claim the franking credits associated with the buyback, the investors must have held the shares for at 
least 45 days on a last-in-first-out basis (paragraphs 207-145(1)(a) and 207-150(1)(a) of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997)). Thus, the ex-entitlement date is not a significant milestone in the buyback 
process because there is generally not 45 days between the ex-entitlement date and the closing date. We have 
performed similar analysis on the sample with ex-entitlement date as the event date and our results confirm this. 
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In a scaleback not all the shares tendered are bought back by the repurchasing company 
Instead the company purchases a pro-rata fraction of the shares tendered by each participant, 
and tax arbitrageurs are left with unsuccessfully tendered shares. To minimize tracking error, 
they must sell their unsuccessfully tendered shares, (perhaps on top of the portfolio 
rebalancing required to track the index), creating negative abnormal returns and positive 
abnormal volumes.  Those buybacks that are subject to scaleback would be expected to have 
greater trading volumes at announcement, if there is tax-induced trading at announcement. 
Whether these greater volumes are associated with greater returns is an empirical issue. The 
expected greater volume at announcement reflects their popularity and their ability to 
generate tax credits for investors. We use the actual ex-post scaleback to divide the sample 
into those buybacks that had a scaleback of tenders applied and those that do not. We state 
the hypotheses using the actual scaleback variable as this divides the sample into ‘popular’ 
and ‘not so popular’ buybacks, and provides a different delineation for the investigation of 
tax-induced trading. 
Hypothesis 1d: At the initial announcement date abnormal volumes are greater for 
those buybacks that have a scaleback relative to those that do not. 
Hypothesis 1e: At the initial announcement date abnormal returns are greater for those 
buybacks that have a scaleback relative to those that do not. 
 
While abnormal trading activities are expected around the announcement date, it is also 
likely that activity will increase around the final announcement date as institutions rebalance 
their portfolios, with selling pressure for buybacks that involve large scalebacks. Under the 
Corporations Act 2001, companies must immediately cancel repurchased shares from the 
share registry.21 Since S&P22 does not adjust the index until the next quarterly rebalancing 
date, (unless the company has repurchased more than 5% of outstanding shares ,where it is 
adjusted at the market close the following Wednesday), any abnormal returns and abnormal 
volumes detected on the final announcement date are attributed to investors selling down the 
recently purchased shares due to the scaleback of the repurchase.  
We expect that buybacks that distribute franking credits will have high demand, and will 
be more likely to have a scaleback of the shares tendered.  At the final announcement date, 
                                                          
21 Within one month of the cancellation, the company must lodge with Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) a notice stating the number and class of shares cancelled and the consideration paid for the 
buyback: Corporations Act 2001, section 254Y. 
22 S&P in conjunction with the ASX have constructed a number of major indexes for the Australian market 
including the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Index and the S&P/ASX 200 Index. 
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we therefore expect significant abnormal trading volumes for buybacks distributing franking 
credits (the FC sample) due to selling pressure caused by tax-arbitrageurs rebalancing their 
portfolio. In contrast, we do not expect selling pressure for the non-FC sample, because these 
buybacks are unlikely to be as popular. Whether or not there are abnormal returns associated 
with these hypothesized abnormal volumes is an empirical issue, but we expect that selling 
pressure will be greater for the FC sample and so we state the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: At the final announcement date abnormal volumes are greater for those 
buybacks that distribute franking credits relative to those that do not. 
 
These effects should also be more pronounced the greater the scaleback. Moreover, the 
greater the scaleback the more popular the buyback and therefore in the presence of tax-
induced trading, the greater the selling pressure at final announcement date. This leads to the 
final hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: At the final announcement date abnormal volumes are greater for those 
buybacks that have a scaleback relative to those that do not. 
 
We also test for abnormal returns around the closing date but do not explicitly state 
hypotheses concerning them. 
  
3.2 Data 
Data on off-market equal access share buybacks are collected from Company 
Announcements of the SIRCA database and verified using announcements reported on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) web site. Daily share prices, trading volumes and 
intraday trade and quote data are collected from SIRCA. The share prices are then adjusted 
for capitalization changes and dividends. Information on scalebacks, shortfalls, deemed 
capital amounts, franked dividends, events dates (initial announcement date and the 
announcement date of the size of scale-back and buyback price) are collected from company 
announcements. The data have been manually checked for consistency. The sample consists 
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of 58 equal access off-market buybacks conducted between 1997 and 2011. 23  Market 
capitalizations are collected from Fin Analysis.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the buyback sample. The average market 
capitalization of the sample is $16,100 million.24 The average discount per share is $0.88 
(median $0.28) and average scaleback is 26.96 percent. While the greater percentage of 
buybacks is conducted at a discount (average discount of 9.48 percent, median 9.07 percent), 
there exists some buybacks conducted at a premium (average premium 17.02 percent, median 
8.28 percent). Relative to the mean initial discount (difference between initial announcement 
price and the offer price divided by the initial announcement price), the mean final discount 
(difference between final announcement price and the offer price divided by the final 
announcement price) is higher than the initial discount for the full sample due to the higher 
market price at closing on average. Companies bought back 3.2 billion shares, distributing 
$32.9 billion in cash and $24 billion in tax credits in total. The total number of shares bought 
back over the total shares outstanding (at the time of the buyback) for all companies is on 
average 8.83  percent (median 5.53 percent).  
As shown in Panels B and C of Table 1, our sample contains 34 Dutch auction and 24 
fixed price tenders. The average market capitalization, offer price, discount, franked dividend, 
proportion of shares bought over shares sought, and proportion of scaleback are greater for 
Dutch auctions relative to fixed price buybacks. With 79 percent of buybacks conducted with 
a franked dividend component, our sample supports the argument of Brown and Norman 
(2010) that the distribution of imputation tax credits is one motivation for undertaking off-
market buybacks. Companies spent four times as much buying back shares through the 34 
Dutch auction tenders and distributed approximately 6 times the dollar value of imputation 
tax credits (on average) as compared to those using a fixed price tender. Panels D and E show 
that buybacks with a franked dividend component result in a discount of 6.86 percent on 
average. On the other hand, buybacks without franked dividend components result in a 
premium of 21.82 percent on average. Panel F shows that large companies usually scale back 
their off market buybacks due to the high demand for their share buyback offer. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                          
23 Although the sample size appears small, it consists of all usable off-market buybacks between 1997 and 2011. 
Some buybacks are excluded from the sample. For example, delisted companies (for which data was not 
available, or the repurchase was part of the delisting process), some early cases where data is unavailable, 
repurchases as part of a merger process, non-standard arrangements (such as associated exchanges or issues of 
securities) and those cancelled without completion.  
24 All figures are quoted in A$ in this paper. 
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3.3 Research Method 
3.3.1 Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Volumes 
We investigate the abnormal returns and abnormal volumes of share trading surrounding 
the two key dates in the off-market buybacks, namely the buyback announcement day and 
buyback final announcement day.  
Abnormal returns (ARi,t) are estimated using the market model,  
𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 −∝𝑖− 𝛽𝑖𝐴𝑚,𝑡 , (1) 
 where Ri,t is the continuously compounded return, and Rm,t is the return on the S&P/ASX All 
Ordinaries value-weighted index, a broadly-based index composed of the top 500 stocks 
ranked by market capitalization (see Brown and Warner 1985). The coefficients of this model, 
αi and βi are from a linear regression of the firm’s stock return (Ri,t) on the market proxy 
index (Rm,t), in the estimation period of 260 days to 61 days before announcement day (day -
260 to day -61).  





 ,  (2) 
where Vol is daily trading volume and NVol is an estimate of normal trading volume for each 
buyback. We estimate normal trading volume as the average daily volume over days -120 
through -20 relative to the announcement of the buyback date.25 Consistent with Lakonishok 






 ,   (3) 




σ(AVolt )  .
    (4) 
To disentangle the information effects and tax induced trading surrounding off-market 
buybacks, the sample is divided into 2 subsamples: off-market buybacks that distribute 
imputation tax credits to participants (FC sample) and off-market buybacks that do not 
distribute imputation tax credits to participants (non-FC sample). We expect higher 
                                                          
25  Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) use a second calendar time method to reduce the problem of time 
clustering of the data. It is unlikely that time clustering is an issue with our sample of buybacks as there are only 
three instances where the buyback announcement dates fall on the same calendar days. 
26 𝜎(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡) is the estimated standard deviation computed in the period -120 to -20 relative to the announcement 
of buyback, and 𝜎(𝑆𝐴𝐴������) is the standard deviation of the mean standardized abnormal volume. As abnormal 
volume is positively skewed, using parametric t-test is questionable (Lakonishok and Vermaelen 1986). Thus, 
we also use a non-parametric signed rank test in calculating p-value.  
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announcement abnormal returns for the FC sample, as they should reflect both tax-induced 
trading (price pressure) and information effects while announcement abnormal returns for the 
non-FC sample should only reflect the information effect. Hence, the difference in abnormal 
returns between the two samples reflects price pressure effects. For the non-FC sample, any 
abnormal trading volumes can be attributed only to informed trading, and not to tax-induced 
trading. Thus, smaller abnormal trading volumes are expected for the non-FC sample as 
compared to the FC sample, and the difference between the two sub-samples’ abnormal 
volumes is attributed to tax-induced trading. In addition we use the ex post scaleback 
indicator to divide the sample, arguing that the scaleback variable is a measure of the 
popularity of the buyback and so should be associated with abnormal volumes around 
announcement 
 
3.3.2 Liquidity Measures 
Madhaven (2000) documents that trading volume is negatively associated with stock 
spreads. Consistent with Madhaven (2000), we expect the abnormal volumes observed at 
initial and final announcement dates to result in higher trading liquidity and lower stock 
spreads. To investigate the liquidity of trading surrounding the initial and final buyback 
announcement dates, we include two low frequency liquidity measures, net buying pressure 
and the Amihud illiquidity measure. In addition we include the effective spread which is 
measured using high frequency data.  
The concept of net buying pressure is borrowed from the option market literature (see for 
example, Bollen and Whaley (2004)27 and Chan et al. (2010)). Bollen and Whaley (2004) 
suggest that changes in implied volatility of options contracts are associated with net buying 
pressure from public order flow while Chan et al. (2010) find that net buying pressure of puts 
in the S&P 500 future options market exhibit a counter-cyclical pattern where more intense 
buying pressure is detected during market contractions. We apply a similar concept in the 
context of our analysis to investigate the net buying pressure at the initial and final 
announcement dates of share buybacks. Net buying pressure (NBP) is measured as: 
 –    Pr   t t
t
N Ask N BidNet Buying essure
N
=   (5) 
                                                          
27 Bollen and Whaley (2004) defined net buying pressure (NBP) as the difference between buyer-motivated 
trades and seller-motivated trades times the absolute value of the option’s delta, scaled by total trading volumes 
of all options series in the class in a day. 
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where Nt Ask is the number of trades at the ask price and Nt Bid is the number of trades at the 
bid price on day t and Nt is the total number of trades on day t .  
   
 The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is a measure of price impact, which can be 
interpreted as the daily price response associated with one dollar of trading volume. It is 






=     (6) 
where Rt is the stock return on day t and Volt is the dollar volume on day t. A higher Amihud 
illiquidity ratio indicates lower stock liquidity. In general the measure is calculated by 
averaging over positive volume days; we report the measure each day in our event window. 
For high frequency measures of liquidity we filter all negative spreads from the trade and 
quote data. The effective half spread measures the cost of executing trades within the inside 
spread.28 We estimate the effective half spread following Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) 
as:  






=  (7) 
where Dit is a dummy variable equal to +1 for buyer initiated trades and -1 for seller-initiated 
trades, Pit is the trade price and Mit is the spread midpoint immediately before the trade.  
 
3.3.3 Regression Analysis 
Should there be any link between abnormal returns or volumes on announcement day 
and those on the closing date? On the one hand one might suspect that for very ‘popular’ 
buybacks where the market anticipates large tax benefits, market exuberance and tax-induced 
price pressures will lead to higher abnormal volumes on announcement. If the popularity of 
the buyback is reflected in greater scaleback, at the final closing date the selling pressure 
should be greater and the abnormal returns at the close more negative. We therefore propose 
a relation between the abnormal returns on the final announcement date and abnormal returns 
on the initial announcement date, initial SAV and final SAV, length, and scaleback as 
described in the model below.  
                                                          
28 Prior studies indicate that many equity trades actually occur at prices inside the posted bid and ask quotes and 
thus quoted spreads provide biased estimates of actual execution costs. Thus, the effective half-spread is a better 
measure of trading costs actually paid by the trader than quoted spreads (Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997). 
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1 2 3 4 5     46Final AR Initial AR Initial SAV Final SAV Dum ScalebackDuma b b b b b e
− − +− −
= + + + + + +
(8)  
where  
Final AR = Abnormal return on the final announcement date 
Initial AR = Abnormal return on the initial announcement date  
Initial SAV = Standardised Abnormal Volumes on the initial announcement date  
Final SAV = Standardised Abnormal Volumes on the final announcement date  
Dum46 = 1 if the number of days between announcement and share buyback dates is greater 
than 46 days, 0 otherwise   
ScalebackDum = 1 if scaleback is announced on the final announcement date, 0 otherwise.  
 
The expected signs on each of the coefficients are indicated in equation (8). As argued 
previously buybacks announced at a discount to market price are unlikely to have 
undervaluation signaling effects. Therefore we expect higher abnormal volumes at 
announcement to be associated with lower final announcement abnormal returns due to the 
likely scaleback of offers and the consequent selling of firms’ shares. The higher is the 
volume at the final announcement date, the greater the likely selling pressure and the lower 
the final abnormal returns.  Hence we expect a negative coefficient on b3.  Investors can 
claim the imputation tax credits only if the shares are held for 45 days not including purchase 
and sale dates. We therefore expect buybacks where the number of days between 
announcement and share buyback date is greater than 46, will have greater abnormal returns 
because investors who satisfy this criterion (the 45-day rule) will obtain tax benefits from the 
buyback. Hence we expect a positive coefficient on b4. We also include a Scaleback dummy 
in the model. We expect the abnormal returns on the final announcement date to be more 
negative if a scaleback is announced; hence b5 is expected to be negative.  
4. Results and Discussion 
The volume and returns results are presented first for the initial announcement date, then for 
the final completion announcement date. After that we move to an exploration of the liquidity 






4.1 Buyback Announcement Date 
Table 2 presents results for the daily average abnormal volumes for an event window [-5, 
+5] relative to the announcement of the buyback for the full sample and various sub-samples 
Table 3 presents the same information for abnormal returns. Parametric t-statistics and non-
parametric signed rank test are used to test the significance of the mean abnormal returns 
during the event window. The non-parametric test is used for abnormal volumes because of 
non-normality of the distribution of volumes.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Inspecting volumes and abnormal returns for the full sample around the announcement 
date we find support for Hypothesis 1a. We find evidence consistent with our expectation of 
abnormal trading around buyback announcements. As presented in Table 2, there is a 294 
percent increase in abnormal trading activity on Day 0, 290 percent on Day +1 and 175 
percent on Day +2 and 62 percent on Day +3, all of which are significant at least at the 5 
percent level. Our evidence is consistent with Brown (2007) but larger in magnitude. Brown 
(2007) finds SAVs of 85 percent and 53 percent above normal levels on Day 0 and Day 1 
respectively.  Furthermore, there is also evidence of a run-up in Standardised Abnormal 
Volume (SAV) preceding the announcement of the buyback. Consistent with the argument in 
Brown (2007), this phenomenon suggests that investors purchase shares prior to buyback 
announcements in order to participate in the buyback and to satisfy the qualified person (45-
day) rule, as there may be less than 45 days between the announcement and the close of the 
buyback. The knowledge of an up-coming buyback may come from management announcing 
buyback intent in an earlier context such as at the previous Annual General Meeting.  
 In Table 3 we find a mean abnormal return of 2.13 percent on announcement day that 
is significant at the 1 percent level. The significance persists until Day +1 after which 
negative mean abnormal returns are found (significant for Day +3 and Day +5). Our results 
are consistent with the results documented by Brown (2007), but slightly larger in magnitude 
perhaps due to a longer sample period. Brown (2007) observes abnormal returns of 1.235 
percent and 0.925 percent on Day 0 and Day 1 respectively, for the sample of off-market 
buybacks in Australia over the period 1996 to 2003.  However, our result is lower than the 
7.7 percent observed by Bagwell (1991) who examines US self-tender offers. In conclusion 
Hypothesis 1a is supported; abnormal returns and volumes are observed around the 
announcement of off-market repurchases. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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In order to tease out to what extent the abnormal trading activity is tax driven we report 
the results by whether the buybacks distribute franking credits (FC) or not (non-FC). For the 
FC sub-sample, in Table 2 we find evidence consistent with tax-induced trading. The SAV is 
378 percent above the normal volume on Day 0, 370 percent on Day +1, 205 percent on Day 
+2 and 81 percent on Day +3, all of which are significant at the 1 percent level. These large 
abnormal volumes highlight the tax-induced buying pressure created by investors buying 
shares in order to participate in the buyback. In contrast for the non-FC sample the volumes 
at announcement and subsequently are mostly insignificant.29 Since there are no franking 
credits associated with these buybacks, there is no incentive for investors to get into the 
market early to qualify for the 45 day rule. Consistent with our expectation, SAVs of the non-
FC sample are significantly lower than the FC sample at the 1 percent level on Day 0 to Day 
+4. Hypothesis 1b is supported, a result that is consistent with the existence of tax-induced 
trading by tax arbitrageurs. 
The abnormal volumes reported for the FC sample are associated with abnormal returns 
on announcement day (significant at 1%), as reported in Table 3. The abnormal returns for 
the non-FC sample are also significant (at the 5% level). Buybacks that do not distribute 
franking credits (non-FC) are often conducted at a premium rather than a discount, which 
may signal firm undervaluation. The structure of these buybacks is similar to self-tender 
offers in the US, where the positive mean abnormal returns may reflect an information effect. 
Buybacks that distribute franking credits (the FC sample) are usually conducted at a discount, 
hence the positive mean abnormal returns on Day 0 and +1 do not reflect undervaluation. The 
positive market reaction to the FC sample announcements likely reflects the tax benefits 
associated with buybacks and the fact that the company is buying back shares at a price 
below the market price (a positive net present value (NPV) investment). The fact that the 
abnormal returns for the FC sample are not significantly different from those for the non-FC 
sample implies that disentangling information, tax and investment effects is difficult. The 
results imply no support for Hypothesis 1c that the abnormal returns of the FC sample are 
greater than those observed for the non-FC sample. Worthy of note is the observation that 
CARs for the FC sample over the period [0, +2] are 3.06 percent whilst those for the non-FC 
sample are 0.00 percent over the same window, largely reflecting the tax advantages of 
trading in the shares of buybacks distributing franking credits. 
                                                          
29 The volumes tend to be lower than normal volumes on average over the event window. 
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Another approach to investigating the effects of abnormal trading is to divide the sample 
based on the popularity of the buyback. We achieve this by creating subsamples of buybacks 
with scaleback and without scaleback in Tables 2 and 3.  The SAVs for the scaleback sample 
are large and significant on Days 0, +1 and +2, consistent with tax-induced trading around the 
announcement day.30 On Day 0 the abnormal volume is a large and significant 396 percent 
above the normal trading volume. Scaleback is associated with the popularity of the buybacks. 
Thus these buybacks typically attract significant institutional participation, leading to higher 
abnormal volumes on announcement day and the two following days. By comparison, in the 
non-scaleback sample trading volumes are lower, with the difference in volumes between the 
two samples statistically significant on Day 1. The abnormal returns (Table 3) for the 
scaleback (non-scaleback) sample are 2.54 % (1.54%) on Day 0, but they are not statistically 
different from each other over the whole event window.  Therefore we find some support for 
Hypothesis 1d that abnormal volumes are larger for buybacks that are scaled back but none 
for Hypothesis 1e that abnormal returns are larger for this subsample.  
Before coming to overarching conclusions regarding the evidence for tax-induced trading 
we examine market activities around the conclusion of the buyback, when the company 
announces the final clearing price for the buyback and the extent of any scaleback.  
 
  4.2 Buyback Final Announcement Day (Announcement of Scaleback and Offer Price) 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for abnormal volumes and abnormal returns 
respectively around the final announcement date. We are particularly interested in abnormal 
volumes as these will add to the evidence on tax-induced trading. Returns are also considered 
for any information effects. We divide the sample in a similar way to the approach used for 
the initial announcement date. If tax-induced trading exists then we expect to see larger 
abnormal volumes for the FC sample and the scaleback sample around the final date, as tax 
arbitrageurs sell any excess shares they purchased at announcement. This observation should 
be in sharper definition for the FC/non-FC division of the sample as investors have 
information about the tax structure at initial announcement, whereas scaleback information is 
not known until the final date. Table 4 reports that the abnormal volumes on the final date for 
the FC sample are significant at the 1% level on days 0, +1, +2, +3. For example, on day 0 
the volume is 236% above the normal volume. Moreover on days 0, +1 and +2 the abnormal 
volumes are significantly greater than the abnormal volumes recorded for the non-FC sample, 
                                                          
30 In order to claim the tax benefits investors generally need to buy shares to sell into the buyback within a 
couple of days of the announcement. 
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consistent with tax-induced trading at the final announcement. We also observe significant 
abnormal volumes for the sample of buybacks where the tenders are scaled back, consistent 
with the idea that tax arbitrageurs are selling excess shares when a scaleback occurs. But 
consistent with the argument about the FC/nonFC division providing a clearer delineation for 
tax induced trading the difference between the abnormal volumes on day 0 for the scaleback 
and non-scaleback samples is only marginally significant. Thus Hypothesis 2a is supported 
and there is marginal support for Hypothesis 2b.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 5 reports the average abnormal returns around buyback final announcement day. 
For the full sample the results are not statistically strong. However, interestingly, for the FC 
sample, the positive mean abnormal return on Day 0 of 0.59 percent (significant at the 1%  
and 5% level for the parametric test and non-parametric test respectively) could be due to a 
positive wealth effect where the announcement of completion of the buybacks at a discount 
represent a positive NPV project from the shareholders’ point of view. Alternatively, the 
market simply views the successful completion of the buyback as positive news. However, 
after Day 1, the selling pressure seems to outweigh the positive wealth effect leading to 
negative abnormal returns for the following days. For the non-FC sample, the negative mean 
abnormal returns for Day +1 and +4 could indicate a negative wealth effect (i.e. a negative 
net present value decision) where buybacks are completed at a premium. The mean abnormal 
returns are negative and statistically significant for the scaleback sample on Day 0, Day +1, 
and Day +4. The negative abnormal returns likely reflect price pressure effects from tax 
arbitrageurs selling off unsuccessfully tendered shares.  Conversely, the mean abnormal 
return for the non-scaleback sample is 1.56 percent on Day 0 (significant at the 1% level), 
suggesting that the non-scaleback sample is not subject to the same selling pressure. The 
negative abnormal returns following Day 0 may indicate price pressure effects due to 
portfolio rebalancing required when shares are cancelled. 
  [Insert Table 5 about here] 
Summing up, the evidence amounted from the closing date of the buyback provides 
further support for tax-induced trading effects for the sample of buybacks distributing tax 
credits. To provide further evidence of tax-related trading in the next section we explore 




4.3 Further evidence using liquidity measures 
The previous sections have presented evidence consistent with tax-induced trading 
around the announcement date, arguing that buying pressure at the initial announcement date 
and selling pressure for certain buybacks at the final date result in abnormal volumes. To 
further investigate the tax-induced trading hypothesis we measure net buying pressure, the 
Amihud illiquidity measure and the effective half spread around both the initial 
announcement and the final announcement dates. The results are presented in Table 6. At 
initial announcement, we expect to see a build-up of buying pressure as institutions buy 
shares in order to participate in the buyback, consistent with the abnormal volumes 
documented in Table 2. Our findings in Panel A indicate that net buying pressure is negative 
and significant on day -4 and positive and significant on days 0 and +1. The observation of 
positive significant buying pressure around the announcement date is consistent with the 
argument that institutions are buying shares in order to participate in the share buyback. In 
contrast to the initial announcement date, at the final announcement date there is weak 
evidence of selling pressure within the event window. Days -5 and +4 have higher selling 
pressure than in the normal period.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The higher is the Amihud Illiquidity Measure the less liquid the market. Panel B 
shows that the market is significantly more liquid in general in the period surrounding the 
buyback announcement dates.  Only on day +1 does the liquidity drop to a level that is 
significantly below that in the normal period. Similarly, greater liquidity is observed around 
the final announcement date except for day +2.31  These results are consistent with the idea 
that buying pressure around announcement and selling pressure around the final date increase 
market liquidity. Madhaven (2000) documents that volume as a measure of market activity is 
negatively associated with stock spreads. The significant abnormal volumes documented in 
Tables 2 and 3 on days 0, +1, +2 for both the initial and final announcement dates are 
therefore expected to be associated with a decrease in spreads, which is supported by our 
results.  
Using the trade and quote data available from SIRCA we measure the effective half 
spread which represents the cost of executing trades within the inside spread. This measure 
uses high frequency data, taking each trade and using the quote immediately before the trade 
                                                          
31 There is (untabulated) evidence also that the average spread narrows around the announcement dates.  
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to calculate the effective half spread as given by equation (7).32 On Day 0, the mean effective 
half spread becomes narrower and widens again on Day +1. The narrower mean effective half 
spread suggests smaller effective trading costs and hence higher stock liquidity upon buyback 
announcement. This finding is consistent with our earlier analysis employing the net buying 
pressure and Amihud illiquidity measures.  
We have also investigated the three liquidity measures across the FC and non-FC 
samples and the scaleback and non-scaleback samples. In the interests of space these results 
are not tabulated. Briefly, the liquidity measures tend to be significantly different from 
normal periods for the FC sample and the scaleback sample for both announcement dates 
(indicating greater liquidity around the announcement dates), but there is little evidence of 
significant differences across the FC/nonFC samples or scaleback/non-scaleback samples. 
In summary, the liquidity analysis is consistent with the observation of large abnormal 
volumes around the initial and final announcements of the buyback, and add further evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis of tax-induced trading. 
 
4.4 Regression Analysis 
Table 7 presents the results of the regression analysis using different combinations of 
the independent variable. The coefficient on initial SAV is negative and statistically 
significant as predicted for Models (1), (2) and (4). This result corroborates our earlier 
findings that higher SAV at initial announcement indicates that investors may have initially 
bought up too many shares resulting in large sell-offs at the final announcement date when 
the tenders are scaled back, and leading to lower final announcement abnormal returns. Final 
SAV is positive and statistically significant only in Models (1) and (2). The existence of the 
positive relation is puzzling as we expect to see high SAV at the final announcement date due 
to scaleback and sell-off of shares that are unsuccessfully tendered. However, the positive 
relation becomes insignificant when ScalebackDum is taken into account. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient of the ScalebackDum in Models (3) and (4) further 
confirms our findings that negative abnormal returns on final announcement can be attributed 
to investors selling off unsuccessfully tendered shares due to scaleback.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
                                                          
32  We have disaggregated the effective half-spread measure into the Price Impact and Realized Spread 
components (results unreported). The results do not provide incremental information relative to the effective 
half-spread measure. 
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As a robustness test, we rerun our regression model by employing initial and final 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) from Day 0 to Day +1, initial and final Cumulative 
Standardised Abnormal Volumes (CSAVs) from Day 0 to Day +1 because as indicated in our 
earlier analysis, the final AR is positive on Day 0 and only turns negative on Day +1. The 
results of the regression analysis (not tabulated) are consistent with our earlier findings 
except that the initial CSAV is no longer statistically significant.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examines abnormal trading activities in the form of abnormal volumes and 
returns around two key dates for Australian off-market buybacks and investigates the drivers 
of these activities. We find evidence of significant abnormal volumes and returns at buyback 
announcement and final announcement dates. Tax-induced trading on both key dates leads to 
the abnormal volumes. At the initial date tax arbitrageurs buy shares in order to participate in 
the buyback. At the final announcement date they must sell off unsuccessfully tendered 
shares in order to rebalance their portfolios. Our findings suggest that traditional short-
window event studies may not provide the full picture of investor activities around companies’ 
buyback arrangements where there are tax reasons for the trading activity.  
The significant difference in abnormal volumes between the buybacks that distribute 
imputation tax credits versus those that do not highlights the prominence of tax-induced 
trading in off-market buybacks. This tax motivation for trading shares of companies engaging 
in off-market buybacks is unique to Australia due to the imputation tax framework and the 
unusual taxation treatment of Australian off-market buybacks. Low marginal tax rate 
institutional investors are likely to be the tax arbitrageurs in off-market buybacks as for this 
tax clientele the imputation tax benefits outweigh the value lost from selling shares back to 
the company at a discount to the market price.  
In contrast to the results documented by Barclay and Smith (1988) and Oded (2009) for 
US open-market repurchases we find significant increases in stock liquidity around both 
initial and final announcement dates as indicated by the lower Amihud illiquidity and lower 
effective half-spread measures. This finding is consistent with the observed increased 
volumes around the announcement dates (Madhaven 2000). On the initial announcement date, 
there is evidence of positive net buying pressure which supports our conjecture that investors 
are buying shares in order to participate in the buybacks. The net buying pressure is more 
significant for the FC sample relative to the non-FC which again supports our tax hypothesis 
where buybacks that distribute franking credit are in greater demand. There is some evidence 
 26 
of selling pressure (negative net buying pressure) on the final announcement date and the 
improved liquidity (narrower effective spread) can be traced back to the scaleback sample. 
This finding suggests that the greater liquidity at the final announcement date can be 
attributed to investors rebalancing their portfolios due to unsuccessfully tendered shares.  
The findings of this paper have important policy implications. The taxation treatment of 
off-market buybacks is structured in a way where one group of shareholders benefit from 
participating in the buyback (shareholders with a lower marginal tax rate – typically 
institutional shareholders) to the detriment of another group of shareholders (shareholders 
with a higher marginal tax rate – typically retail shareholders). One might argue that the 
trading activity around off-market buybacks seems to be linked to an investor clientele as 
companies favor a buyback structure that benefits their major institutional shareholders. 
Furthermore, because companies typically set 46 clear business days between the date the 
buyback is announced and the date that shares are deemed to be sold into the buyback this 
allows investors (both those who currently hold the shares and those who do not) to 
participate and take advantage of the tax credits attached to the buybacks. The substantial 
volumes of tax-induced trading found in our study provide evidence that supports the 
argument that these complicated tax treatments distort market prices.  
The current structure of off-market buybacks in Australia favors institutional 
shareholders with low marginal tax rates over retail shareholders with higher marginal tax 
rates. Low-tax paying institutions tend to be the marginal investors that have the financial 
capacity to buy up large volumes of shares on announcement of a tax-advantaged repurchase. 
Large volumes of trade at announcement and close of the buyback have the potential to 
distort market prices. Our results therefore have relevance for the demise of the recently 
proposed legislative changes which would have limited the tax benefits associated with 
capital losses from buybacks and lessened price-pressure effects.33 Why the recently elected 
federal government decided not to proceed with the proposed changes is unclear. What is 
clear is that the tax benefits to institutions from current arrangements should result in 
resumption in the use of off-market repurchases. 
 
  
                                                          
33  Changes to the tax treatment of off-market buybacks were first proposed in 2007. Subsequent to 
recommendations of the Board of Tax, in October 2011 the Australian Treasury released draft new legislation 
on the tax treatment of off-market share buybacks. In December 2013, the newly elected Liberal government 
announced that the proposed changes would not be proceeding. As a result of the tax uncertainty there have 
been almost no off-market buybacks distributing tax credits over the period 2011-2013. 
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We illustrate the structuring of Australian off-market repurchases and the tax considerations 
for a superannuation (pension) fund with a tax rate of 15% and an individual paying tax at the top 
marginal rate of 45%. BHP Billiton announced the successful completion of a $6.0 billion off-market 
buyback on 11 April 2011. The final price for the off-market buyback was set at $40.85 per share, 
representing a discount of 14 percent to the market price of $47.4985 (which is calculated as the 
volume weighted average price of BHP Billiton shares over the five trading days up to and including 
the closing date of 8 April 2011).  Due to the strong demand from shareholders to sell shares into the 
buyback, a scaleback of 78.27 percent of tenders was applied. $40.57 of the buyback price was treated 
as a fully franked dividend for tax purposes. $9.31 is the capital component consisting of $0.28 
($40.85 – $40.57) plus $9.03 which is the tax adjustment specified by the Australian Tax Office and 
accounts for the increase in the share price over the period from announcement of the buyback to the 
closing date. 
Consider first a superannuation fund which, several years earlier, had purchased BHP Billiton  
shares for $30. As shown in Table A1, sale of that share on the market at a market price of $47.50 
would generate a net after tax cash flow of $45.75, once tax at 15 per cent had been paid on two-thirds 
of the $17.50 capital gain. (For investors holding the stock for less than one year the entire capital 
gain would be taxable and the calculations in Table A1 would be amended accordingly).  
If the superannuation fund participates in the repurchase at a price of $40.85 then $9.03 is the 
deemed sale price for tax purposes and $40.57 is a dividend franked at a 30 per cent tax rate (the 
corporate tax rate). The superannuation fund makes a capital loss of $20.97 which when offset against 
other realized capital gains in its portfolio reduces tax payable by $2.10. The franked dividend receipt 
implies assessable income of $40.57/0.7 = $57.96, tax credits received of $17.39 and tax assessed of 
$8.69, giving a tax refund of $8.69. The net cash flow is thus $51.64 so that participating at a 
repurchase price of $40.85 is preferable to selling on market for $47.50. In contrast, the individual 
shareholder with a marginal tax rate of 45 per cent would be worse off from participating in the 
repurchase (because even though the tax benefit of the capital loss is greater due to the higher 
marginal tax rate, that higher rate also means additional tax must be paid on the dividend). 
The tax authorities assign a deemed sale price equal to a volume weighted market price 
around the close of the tender offer, and we have used this price as the ‘market price’ in this 
illustration.34 We have ignored the Medicare levy in the 45 percent top marginal tax rate. 
                                                          
34 In January 2004, the ATO issued a draft determination (TD2004/D1) which complicated the determination of 
the capital component. A “deemed” sale price for tax purposes would be determined by adjusting the pre-
announcement company share price by the percentage change in the market index (the S&P/ASX 200) between 
 32 
Table A1: The Repurchase Participation Decision 
The calculations assume that the share has been held for more than one year such that the shareholder is eligible 
for a concessionary rate on the capital gains when sold on market. Superannuation funds are taxed at the rate tp = 
0.15 on income and at the rate (2/3)tp = 0.10 on long term capital gains. For individual shareholders on the top 
marginal tax rate, the rates are respectively tp =0.45 and (1/2)tp = 0.225. Capital losses from participating are 
assumed to be used to offset other short term capital gains. A franked dividend of $D generates a net tax 
payment (rebate) of $D(tp-tc)/(1-tc), where tc =0.30 is the corporate tax rate. 
 
 15 % tax rate 
(superfund) 















Repurchase price (1)  40.85   40.85  
Market price (2) 47.50  47.50  47.50  47.50  
Purchase Price (3) 30.00  30.00  30.00  30.00  
Capital Component (4) na 9.03  na 9.03  
Capital Gain (5) = (2)-(3) or (4)-(3) 17.50  -20.97  17.50  -20.97  
Tax on gain (6) =0.10 (5) or 0.225 (5) 1.75  -2.10  3.94  -2.70  
Announced cash amount of dividend (7)   40.57   40.57  
Tax payable/redeemable on dividend (8)  -8.69   8.69  
Net After Tax Cash Flow 
 (9) = (2) -(6)-(8)  or (1) -(6)-(8)   
45.75  51.64 43.56  34.86  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the announcement date and the tender closing date, and using this figure to calculate the capital component for 
tax purposes.  
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Figure 1 











Figure 1 illustrates the three key event dates for off-market buybacks. t1 is the announcement date, t2 is the ex-entitlement 





















Summary Statistics of Sample Off-Market Buybacks 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 58 off-market buybacks occurring over the period 1997 to 2011. Statistics are also provided for Dutch, fixed, franked, non-franked, 
scaleback and non-scaleback partitions of the sample. Dutch refers to buybacks where offer price is determined via a Dutch auction tender process and fixed refers to buybacks where a fixed 
offer price is announced at the initial announcement. Franked (Non-franked) refers to the presence (absence) of franking credits attaching to the dividend component of buyback price. Scaleback 
(Non-scaleback) refers to unsuccessful (successful) buybacks where not all (all) tendered shares are repurchased by the company. Market cap is measured as the number of shares outstanding at 
the initial announcement multiplied with the current market price. Offer price is the buyback price for a share. Initial discount is measured as the difference between initial announcement price 
and the offer price divided by the initial announcement price. Final discount is measured as the difference between final announcement price and the offer price divided by the final 
announcement price. Total discount is measured as discount per share multiplied by the number of shares bought back. Capital component (Franked dividend component) is the proportion of 
offer price considered as capital (dividend). Amount spent is the number of shares bought back multiplied with offer price per share. Shares Bought/ Shares Outstanding is the percentage of 
shares bought back of total outstanding shares. Shares Bought/Shares Sought is the percentage of shares bought back of shares sought. Scaleback is the percentage of shares tendered but not 
bought back by the repurchasing company. 


































Panel A: All (n = 58) 
Mean 16,100.00 10.25 0.93 2.31 59.12 52.73 47.27 568.00 8.83 103.33 26.96 
Median 5,340.00 5.85 4.08 8.05 11.07 60.19 39.81 300.00 5.53 100.00 0.00 
Sum 936,000.00 




   Panel B: Dutch (n = 34) 
Mean 24,000.00 12.93 8.05 10.63 94.27 35.36 64.64 786.00 5.80 114.53 34.66 
Median 11,400.00 8.75 9.50 13.01 42.32 28.46 71.54 407.00 4.24 111.79 38.88 
Sum 816,000.00 




   Panel C: Fixed (n = 24) 
Mean 5,010.00 6.45 -9.16 -9.49 9.32 64.16 35.84 259.00 13.12 87.45 12.46 
Median 390 2.73  0.00  2.46 0.00 57.75 42.25 80.80 7.33 99.18 0.00 
Sum 120,000.00 




   Panel D: Franked (FC) (n = 46) 
Mean 19,700.00 11.78 6.86 4.38 77.76 66.48 33.52 679.00 7.54 107.8 29.81 
Median 8,900.00 7.12 6.85 4.17 32.12 64.18 35.82 374.00 4.39 100.8 5.65 
Sum 906,000.00 




   Panel E: Non-franked (non-FC) (n = 12) 
Mean 2,470.00 4.4 -21.82 -3.32 -12.36 0.00 100.00 142.00 13.78 86.20 17.11 
Median 225 1.68 -11.37  1.51 -2.68 0.00 100.00 69.80 9.41 95.72 0.00 
Sum 29,700.00 




   Panel F: Scaleback (n = 32) 
Mean 21,800.00 12.16 6.68 9.56 73.18 61.37 38.63 750.00 6.40 113.04 57.43 
Median 8,750.00 7.59 8.82 11.03 20.11 64.89 35.11 337.00 5.16 102.82 60.87 
Sum 698,000.00 




   Panel G: Non-scaleback (n = 26) 
Mean 9,140.00 7.90 -3.07 -25.51 41.81 42.09 57.91 344.00 11.82 91.37 0.00 
Median 1,920.00 4.20  5.42 -11.44 1.71 46.30 53.70 197.00 5.53 88.67 0.00 
Sum 238,000.00 








Standardized Abnormal Volumes around Initial Announcement Day 
 
This table documents mean standardized abnormal volume (SAV) for 58 off-market buybacks around the initial announcement day. This sample is partitioned based on whether franking tax 
credits are attached to the dividend component of a buyback price (Franked vs. Unfranked) and whether scaleback occurs on the final announcement day (Scaleback vs. Non-scaleback). 
Following Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), we compute standardized abnormal volume as 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝜎(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡)  where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = (𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴  , Vol is the daily trading volume and NVol is an 
estimate of normal trading volume for each firm over days -120 through -20 relative to the initial announcement day. Daily mean SAV and non-parametric p-value (see, Brown 2007) for days 
[-5, +5] are presented below. The columns labeled Mann-Whitney p-values give the p-values for a test of difference between the FC and non-FC samples and the scaleback and non-scaleback 
samples.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Day All (n = 59)  FC (n = 46)  Non-FC (n = 13)  Mann-
Whitney  
p-values 























-5 13.20 0.10*  19.95 0.11  -10.68 0.09*  0.08*  4.10 0.14  24.74 0.12  0.83 
-4 19.77 0.08*  32.50 0.11  -25.29 0.04**  0.02**  35.81 0.14  -0.60 0.12  0.11 
-3 8.26 0.01***  16.49 0.06*  -20.87 0.01***  0.37  21.22 0.07*  -8.20 0.02**  0.45 
-2 14.15 0.05**  26.93 0.11  -31.07 0.04**  0.08*  8.82 0.12  20.92 0.08*  0.89 
-1 36.31 0.05**  41.37 0.11  18.40 0.01***  0.36  12.43 0.02**  66.62 0.14  0.19 
0 294.14 0.00***  378.03 0.00***  -2.70 0.21  0.00***  395.57 0.00***  165.41 0.00***  0.11 
1 289.73 0.00***  369.53 0.00***  7.37 0.21  0.00***  358.14 0.00***  202.90 0.01***  0.05** 
2 174.53 0.01***  204.86 0.00***  67.19 0.09*  0.02**  185.92 0.01***  160.06 0.05*  0.74 
3 62.27 0.02**  80.51 0.01***  -2.25 0.16  0.01***  69.68 0.01***  52.86 0.14  0.51 
4 11.79 0.07*  23.06 0.11  -28.11 0.01***  0.01***  14.92 0.10*  7.81 0.14  0.92 







Average Abnormal Returns around Initial Announcement Day 
 
This table documents daily mean abnormal returns around the initial announcement day for 58 off-market buybacks occurring over the period 1997 to 2011. This sample is partitioned based on 
whether franking tax credits are attached to the dividend component of buyback price (Franked vs. Unfranked) and whether scaleback occurs on the final announcement day (Scaleback vs. Non-
scaleback). Daily average abnormal returns are estimated using an event study method based on the market model. The market index is All Ordinaries Index. The estimation period spans from day -
260 to day -61. The results are presented over event window of [-5, +5] relative to the initial announcement day. We report parametric t-statistics based on Brown and Warner (1985) “crude 
dependence adjustment”. Non-parametric signed rank test statistics are also reported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 





















  t-stat Signed rank test 
-5 -0.32  --1.36* -154.00*   -0.13  -0.62     -30.00   -1.37  -1.45* -17.00***   -0.34  -1.33* -71.00*   -0.30  -0.67 -10.50 
-4 -0.09   -0.40 -119.00  -0.32  -1.52* -124.00*  0.98   1.04 4.50  -0.15  -0.58 -71.00*  -0.07  -0.15 -10.50 
-3 -0.07   -0.31    28.50  0.02   0.09   38.00  -0.47  -0.50 -5.50  -0.08  -0.31 26.00  -0.02  -0.04   -1.50 
-2 -0.08  --0.35    13.50  -0.10  -0.49   16.00  0.04   0.04      0.00  0.06   0.24     24.50  -0.26  -0.59   -6.00 
-1 -0.07   -0.29   -17.00  0.11   0.51    8.00  -1.18  -1.25 -3.00  0.12   0.50       4.50  -0.38  -0.85 -17.50 
0 2.13    9.04***  461.00***  2.13  10.11***    345.50***  2.11   2.23**   9.00*  2.54  10.09***  180.50***      1.54  3.44***  60.50** 
1 0.46    1.95**  242.50**  0.80   3.82***   191.50**  -1.27  -1.35*  0.50  0.71   2.80***   85.50**  0.07   0.16  37.00* 
2 -0.05  --0.23   -35.50  0.13   0.04   26.00  -0.84  -0.89    -12.50  -0.01  -0.06 -5.00  -0.08  -0.18    0.00 
3 -0.82   3.48*** -231.50**  -0.75  -3.20***   -153.50**  -1.11  -1.18   -8.50  -0.82  -3.26*** -64.50*  -0.75  -1.67** -44.00* 
4 0.19  - 0.81    38.00  -0.04  -0.96    6.00  1.28   1.36*    4.50  0.31   1.25   15.00  0.04   0.09    9.50 




Standardized Abnormal Volumes around Final Announcement Day 
 
This table documents mean standardized abnormal volume (SAV) for 58 off-market buybacks around the final announcement day. This sample is partitioned based on whether franking tax 
credits are attached to the dividend component of a buyback price (Franked vs. Unfranked) and whether scaleback occurs on the final announcement day (Scaleback vs. Non-scaleback). 
Following Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), we compute standardized abnormal volume as 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝜎(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡)  where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = (𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴  , Vol is the daily trading volume and NVol is an 
estimate of normal trading volume for each firm over days -120 through -20 relative to the initial announcement day. Daily mean SAV and non-parametric p-value (see, Brown 2007) for days [-
5, +5] are presented below. The columns labeled Mann-Whitney p-values give the p-values for a test of difference between the FC and non-FC samples and the scaleback and non-scaleback 
samples.   ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Day All (n = 59)  FC (n = 46)  Non-FC (n = 13)  Mann-
Whitney 
p-values 

























-5 -19.93 0.03**  -18.49 0.04**  -25.02 0.16  0.81  3.94 0.14  -49.35  0.00***  0.03** 
-4 -3.20 0.00***  5.04 0.03**  -32.35 0.04**  0.19  24.63 0.14  -36.08  0.00***  0.01*** 
-3 16.27 0.05**  14.44 0.08*  -22.78 0.16  0.85  40.31 0.12  -5.45 0.02**  0.75 
-2 27.88   0.10*  34.10 0.11  5.86 0.16  0.41  56.17 0.04**   0.82 0.05**  0.13 
-1 30.13   0.10*  43.39 0.11  -16.79 0.09*  0.05**  60.23 0.02**  -1.83  0.00***  0.02** 
0 182.18 0.03**  235.55 0.00***  -6.69 0.01***  0.00***  224.96 0.00***  133.41   0.15  0.06* 
1 92.26 0.02**  121.57 0.00***  -11.43 0.09*  0.00***  104.77 0.00***  76.41   0.15  0.17 
2 86.04 0.02**  113.09 0.00***  -9.68 0.09*  0.00***  92.05 0.02**  77.37   0.12  0.59 
3 52.01 0.03**  61.79 0.01***  17.40 0.21  0.19  62.08 0.02**  42.48   0.14  0.57 
4 17.30   0.10*  21.32 0.08*  3.08 0.04**  0.08*  13.48 0.14  21.08   0.14  0.96 






Average Abnormal Returns around Final Announcement Day 
This table documents daily mean abnormal returns around the final announcement day for 58 off-market buybacks occurring over the period 1997 to 2011. This sample is partitioned based on 
whether franking tax credits are attached to the dividend component of buyback price (Franked vs. Unfranked) and whether scaleback occurs on the final announcement day (Scaleback vs. Non-
scaleback). Daily average abnormal returns are estimated using an event study method based on the market model. The market index is All Ordinaries Index. The estimation period spans from 
day -260 to day -61. The results are presented over event window of [-5, 5] relative to the final announcement day. We report parametric t-statistics based on Brown and Warner (1985) “crude 
dependence adjustment”. Non-parametric signed rank test statistics are also reported.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 













t-stat Signed rank test   
Mean 
AR (%) t-stat 
Signed 




t-stat Signed rank test 
-5 0.40    1.56*  272.00***  0.25  1.28  135.00*   0.52  0.53 10.00*  0.82  3.23*** 177.00***  -0.23 -0.49 -16.50 
-4 0.00    0.02    56.50  -0.06 -0.30     2.50   0.36  0.37 6.00  0.03  0.11   38.50  -0.03 -0.06    0.00 
-3 0.15 0.61  131.00  0.46  2.33**  184.00**  -1.12 -1.15     -9.00  0.09  0.36   52.00  0.26  0.55   20.00 
-2 0.32 1.24  223.50**  0.26  1.32*  138.50**  0.43  0.44 7.00  0.22  0.87   80.50**  0.45  0.95   35.00 
-1 -0.02   -0.06    56.00  0.06  0.31    67.50  -0.95 -0.97 -8.00  0.05  0.18     1.50  -0.11 -0.23   21.00 
0 0.33 1.30*  175.00*  0.59  2.97***  158.00**  -0.65 -0.67       1.00  -0.53 -2.09**  -54.50  1.56      3.31***   85.50*** 
1 -0.43  -1.70** -196.00**  -0.33 -1.65** -105.00  -1.59 -1.63*    -17.00***  -0.36 -1.43*  -71.50*  -0.53 -1.13 -32.50 
2 -0.35   -1.38* -192.00**  -0.44 -2.20** -188.00**   0.07  0.07  1.00  -0.20 -0.80  -31.50  -0.56 -1.18 -56.50** 
3 -0.14   -0.53   -80.00  -0.18 -0.92   -67.50   0.38  0.39       2.00  -0.14 -0.55  -43.50  -0.13 -0.28   -8.50 
4 -0.75   -2.95*** -364.00***  -0.59 -2.95*** -236. 00***  -1.73 -1.77**    -21.50***  -0.60 -2.35***  -91.50**  -0.95 -2.02** -90.00*** 




Net Buying Pressure, Amihud Illiquidity and Effective Half Spread measures around Initial and Final Announcement Days 
 
This table documents mean net buying pressure (Panel A), the Amihud illiquidity measure (Panel B) and the effective half spread (Panel C) for 58 off-market buybacks around the initial and 
final announcement days. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using parametric tests. The non-parametric signed test is in parentheses ().  
 
 
Initial Announcement Period 
 
Final Announcement Period 
Day Event Normal period Difference 
 
Event Normal period Difference 
        Panel A: Net Buying Pressure 
-5 -0.0544 -0.0376 -0.0233 
 
-0.1308 -0.0376 -0.1076** 
-4 -0.1408 -0.0376 -0.1034**(**) 
 
0.0426 -0.0376  0.0869* 
-3 -0.0420 -0.0376 -0.0045 
 
-0.0153 -0.0376 0.0086 
-2 -0.0853 -0.0376 -0.0598 
 
-0.0172 -0.0376 0.0113 
-1 -0.0781 -0.0376 -0.0524 
 
-0.0468 -0.0376 -0.0290 
0 0.0423 -0.0376  0.0690*(***) 
 
-0.0072 -0.0376 0.0202 
1 0.0696 -0.0376  0.1035***(***) 
 
-0.0596 -0.0376 -0.0300 
2 -0.0432 -0.0376 -0.0162 
 
-0.0340 -0.0376 -0.0128 
3 -0.0362 -0.0376 -0.0057 
 
-0.0231 -0.0376 0.0036 
4 0.0221 -0.0376 0.0540 
 
-0.1179 -0.0376 -0.0907** 
5 -0.0411 -0.0376 -0.0159 
 
-0.0436 -0.0376 -0.0380 
        Panel B: Amihud Illiquidity*1000 
-5 0.0499 0.4470 -0.0127(***) 
 
0.0073 0.4470 -0.3877 
-4 0.0884 0.4470 0.0505 
 
0.0033 0.4470 -0.3188(**) 
-3 0.0396 0.4470 -0.3771(***) 
 
0.0053 0.4470 -0.3271(**) 
-2 0.0024 0.4470 -0.3523(*) 
 
0.0152 0.4470 -0.3559(***) 
-1 0.0153 0.4470 -0.3369(**) 
 
0.0161 0.4470 -0.3135 
0 0.0236 0.4470 -0.3228 
 
0.0096 0.4470 -0.3051(**) 
1 1.0730 0.4470  0.6981(***) 
 
0.0028 0.4470 -0.3748(***) 
2 0.0275 0.4470 -0.4233(**) 
 
2.0821 0.4470  1.7072(***) 
3 0.0327 0.4470 -0.4141(***) 
 
0.0152 0.4470 -0.3433(***) 
4 0.2343 0.4470 -0.1393 
 
0.0068 0.4470 -0.4462(***) 
5 0.0166 0.4470 -0.3549(**) 
 
0.1627 0.4470 -0.2690(*) 
        Panel C: Effective Half Spreads 
-5 0.2460 0.4029 0.0099 
 
0.3787 0.4029 0.2142 
-4 0.1769 0.4029 -0.0281 
 
0.1740 0.4029 0.0034 
-3 0.2242 0.4029 -0.0749 
 
0.2174 0.4029 0.0295 
-2 0.1308 0.4029 -0.0233 
 
0.1957 0.4029 0.0290 
-1 0.1563 0.4029 -0.0544 
 
0.1014 0.4029 -0.0019 
 40 
0 0.1785 0.4029 -0.0792(**) 
 
0.1611 0.4029  0.0071(*) 
1 0.1958 0.4029 -0.0566(***) 
 
0.1949 0.4029 0.0409 
2 0.1359 0.4029 -0.0702(***) 
 
0.1517 0.4029 -0.0119 
3 0.3972 0.4029 0.1301 
 
0.2756 0.4029  0.0320 
4 0.1272 0.4029 -0.0225(**) 
 
0.4160 0.4029 0.1703 
5 0.1208 0.4029 -0.0885 
 





This table documents regression results of the following regression: 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴 𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴 𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴 𝑆𝐴𝐴 +
𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴 𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝐷46 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜀 , where Final AR = Abnormal return on the final announcement date, Initial AR 
= Abnormal return on the initial announcement date, Initial SAV = Standardised Abnormal Volumes on the initial announcement 
date, Final SAV = Standardised Abnormal Volumes on the final announcement date, Dum46 = 1 if the number of days between 
announcement and buyback dates is greater than 46 days, 0 otherwise (+), ScalebackDum = 1 if scaleback is announced on the final 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial AR -0.1700 -0.1780 -0.1280 -0.1340 
 (-1.5260) (-1.5670) (-1.3170) (-1.3510) 
Initial SAV -0.001** -0.0010** -0.0001 -0.0001* 
 (-2.3770) (-2.4920) (-1.5990) (-1.7050) 
Final SAV 0.0020** 0.0020** 0.0010 0.001 
 (2.5130) (2.3720) (1.3360) (1.3180) 
Dum46  0.0070  0.0040 
  (1.5110)  (1.1070) 
Scaleback Dum   -0.0220*** -0.0200*** 
   (-3.2270) (-3.1990) 
Constant 0.0009* 0.0030 0.0200** 0.0160** 
 (1.7190) (0.8050) (2.6640) (2.3010) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.2050 0.1980 0.3560 0.3430 
     
 
 
